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A b s t r a c t
The paper assesses the developments in the financial accounts of the balance of payments in 15 transition
countries in Central, Baltic and South-Eastern Europe. It is a follow-up of the IES working paper no. 49 of May,
2004, that dealt with the state of current accounts in these countries. In contrast to the early stages of transition
when the external balance was often the source of economic instability in the region and required a deep
undervaluation of the exchange rate, the performance of financial accounts reflects a high degree of restructuring,
progressing advance patterns of integration and stability of these economies. The composition of foreign
financing has been changing in the last 5 years. The risk of indebtedness, which would be unsustainable to
disburse, has been declining, even though there are still present the dangers of a financial crisis is some countries
due to the fiscal indiscipline and immodest wage hikes. In the last 5 years the FDI flows have been gradually
changing both their direction and composition. Both of them indicate that financial capital shortage is not any
longer the primary constraint on the development of these transition countries. The tendency towards financial
flows, whose pattern is typical for stabilised advanced economies and which reflects the needs of post-industrial
patterns of development, is present throughout the region.
Abstrakt
Článek se zabývá analýzou vývoje finančních účtů platebních bilancí 15 transitivních zemí ve Střední a
Jihovýchodní Evropě. Navazuje na pracovní materiál WP IES č. 49 z května 2004, který se zabýval stavem
běžných účtů týchž zemí. Na rozdíl od 90. let, když vnější nerovnováha byla častým zdrojem hospodářské
nestability v tomto regionu, stav finančních účtů ve výrazné většině zemi se nyní stabilizoval a odráží pokroky
v  restrukturalizaci výroby a v intenzívní integraci s  Evropskou unií. Struktura finančních účtů se v  průběhu
posledních 5 let změnila jak ve směrech svých toků, tak v kvalitě a začala se blížil ve svých charakteristikách
účtům vyspělých zemí. Riziko neudržitelného zadlužování se nyní už nevyskytuje v  žádné zemi, i když
v několika případech stále hrozí to, že fiskální nedisciplinovanost a příliš vysoké požadavky na mzdové nárůsty
změní deficit  platební bilance v  brzdu vysokého ekonomického růstu. I v  těchto případech je ale zřejmé, že
přístup k  financím už není primárním omezením na rozvoj tranzitivních ekonomik. Finančním účtům nyní
dominuje role přijatých přímých zahraničních investic. Současně ale roste význam reinvestovaných zisků,
repatriovaných dividend a vývoz kapitálu. Disponibilita světových financí je tak vysoká, že zásoba oficiálních
rezerv rostla ve všech 15 pozorovaných zemích.
Caveat for the readers:
A part of this analysis was used by United Nations, Economic Commission for Europe, in
their Economic Survey of Europe, no. 1, 2004. This text therefore differs from the text finally
published by UNECE both in contents and editing. For the purposes of quoting the official
document, please turn at its final version at http://www.unece.org/ead/pub/041/041c3.pdf.
1/  The State of Financial /Capital/ Accounts in General
The year of 2003 was a sort of finishing spurt of the long-lasting preparations for eight
of these countries before their accession to the EU in May 2004. Their economies have
undergone 14 years of transformation and some of them have even overcome three recessionsfrom the adjustment requirements. Thus, at this rather closing stage of transition, we could
find them well prepared for the integration with the EU. The economic growth was  highly
satisfactory in the majority of them and even the remaining seven economies of South-East
Europe were performing very well in that respect.
The scenarios of convergence, especially due to highly favourable developments in the
competitiveness of trade, could finally look more optimistic than ever before. The current
accounts deficits did not pose a great danger because they did not require a large openness in
the financial accounts for their financing. The risks for losing official reserves on that account
did not look large even for those 2 or 3 countries that had the largest current accout deficit.
We can characterise it that the quantity of foreign financing is yielding to the demands for its
quality, which reflect the mature stage of their restructuring.
In January-September 2003, net financial flows to eastern Europe amounted to $27
billion, somewhat less than during the same period of 2002 (see table 1).  Probably the record
high level of net financial flows reported in 2002 will be difficult to reach in the near future as
the privatization in the region (an important destination of external financial flows) has
already passed its peak.1  It could be expected that the present rate of net external financing
(on average, between 6-7 per cent of GDP) will tend to stabilise or even decline.  The rates of
domestic savings are generally high in the majority of these countries and the reliance on large
financial injections from abroad will probably diminish in the future.  What is more important
now is the quality and composition of foreign capital inflows: the proper match between
external and domestic resources and the type of spillovers generated by foreign capital in the
domestic markets.
In 2003 there was a notable shift in the direction of FDI inflows to different east
European subregions. While FDI flows south-east European countries increased significantly,
the net balance of FDI in acceding countries decreased sharply as a result of rising FDI
outflows and due to a decline in inflows to all central European economies in the first three
quarters of the year (table 2 and table 5).  Other financial flows to east European countries
were rather volatile (not only in 2003 but also in previous years).  For example, in 2002-2003
the absorption of short-term funds increased in the majority of the acceding countries,
especially in Poland, Hungary, Czechia and Estonia whereas the demand for long-term funds
and portfolio investments was more pronounced in countries with lower FDI inflows (as the
south-east European economies).
With a net contribution by $4.9 billion in the first nine months of 2003, long-term and
portfolio investments were the most important source of external financing in south-east
Europe.  In virtually all 15 countries, effective financial flows (net of change in reserves)
exceeded the absolute value of current account deficits, continuing a trend observable already
in previous years.  These economies (especially the acceding countries) are now generally
considered as attractive by international investors, as is documented by relatively favourable
ratings of their creditworthiness.2  The purchases of foreign exchange by national banks in
                                                
1 Between 1992 and 2002 the net financial inflows effectively absorbed by the economies (i.e.
excluding the official reserves) increased more than 10-fold reaching $41.5 billion in 2002.
2 Thus six our of 15 countries were ranked in the first three deciles among more than 150 countries
evaluated by Institutional Investor, Country Credit Ranking, as of September, 2003.eastern Europe (in most cases aiming at easing the pressures on exchange rates) amounted to
1.8 per cent of the GDP (table 1).
2/ Capital Volatility and Policy Response
Contrary to expectations that the influx of foreign borrowing would weaken the
exchange rate in transition countries, it reveals their sound foundations of restructuring as the
exchange rates appreciate in real terms meanwhile the export competitiveness does not show
signs of weakening. The high inflows of foreign funds, rising indebtedness and the state of
monetary reserves (table 3) are having also a significant effect on the conduct of monetary
policy in the eastern European countries, none of which has now a pure freely floating
exchange rate regime. Many of them have a currency board monetary system or exchange
rates that are not very volatile vis-a-vis euro.  Exchange rate management under less flexible
adjustment regimes carry certain risks, especially in an environment of high budget deficits.
The later is the weakest side of monetary policy on many of them.  A large influx of foreign
capital generally exerts an upward pressure on the exchange rate; besides, it triggers a
monetary expansion, which may lead to overheating and higher inflation.  The result may be a
further deterioration in the trade balance and even higher foreign borrowing pressure that is
not on a sustainable performance path.  A pressure for an appreciation may revert suddenly to
a pressure for depreciation, as the case of Hungary showed in 2003.
There were three speculative attacks at forint in 2003 - in January, June and November.
The speculators first attacked the the lower (appreciation) band of the fluctuation constraint.
Already in 2001 the Hungarian National Bank (HNB) has declared a monetary regime copying
the functioning of ERM-2, what may have been premature. A high interest rate attracted large
capital inflows but the interventions of the HNB of more than € 5 billion in January 2003
avoided the danger of appreciation. However, after 2001 Hungarian deficit spending rose to
9.2% of GDP, the wages soared and the competitiveness of the domestic economy suffered.
When in June the HNB depreciated the central parity of forint by negligible 2.26%, it
weakened the credibility of sustainable macroeconomic policies, which triggered the capital
flight. HNB had to raise the interest rate to 9.5 % in order to fend off the exchange rate
decline and keep the inflation low. At the same time the substantial foreign financing of the
government debt continued while the FDI inflows declined sharply. In November 2003 it was
revealed that the position of Hungarian balance of payments was more fragile than expected.
The interest rate was increased to 12.5% - by 10% higher than in the Eurozone - in order to
keep the foreign capital in the country. It was a costly intervention that will have long-lasting
negative impacts not only on the Hungarian economy.
On the other hand, sterilisation of the monetary overhang is a costly policy option and
may be counterproductive, especially in the presence of interest differentials.  Overall, with
fully liberalised capital flows, appreciating equilibrium real exchange rates (related to their
relatively fast growth) and still perceptible interest differentials, the acceding east European
economies are particularly exposed to international financial pressures.  Besides, such flows
can be not only very high but also their net balances are subject to high volatility (tables 1
through 3).  Under such circumstances, the degrees of policy freedom are rather limited, as
was clearly revealed in the description of policy turmoil in Hungary.  All these factors have
probably prompted the national banks in some acceding countries to reconsider their previousplans for early entry into the EMU.  A conspicuous premature accession to euro can backfire,
especially if the economy’s adjustment to the market parameters of the customs union is not
complete and the economy is not satisfying the criteria of optimum currency area.3
Subject to the recent findings about how the fundamentals of post-transition
economies evolve, more economists are now prone to agree that the constraints built into
ERM-2 are not commensurate with the natural mechanism of nominal and real convergence of
transition countries.4 With fully liberalised capital flows, appreciating equilibrium real
exchange rates and investment yields higher than what present security yields offer in the rest
of the world, the acceding east European economies are particularly exposed to international
financial pressures. As is documented in tables 1 through 4, such flows can be not only very
high but also their net balances are subject to high volatility. The trend for real appreciation,
entailed by continued productivity and terms of trade gains, will have to come out either by
nominal appreciation or by inflation in excess of EU partners.
Since this problem is intrinsically structural and not symmetric along all industries,
commodities and enterprises, its solution rests more in price hikes than in the tolerated
appreciation of exchange rate parity. If the ceiling prescribed for the inflation by ERM rules is
too low, an early adoption of euro may become excessively costly. In addition, the
problematic high “inflation” in transition countries may be in some cases only virtual –
lacking the attributes of fiscal or monetary indiscipline. Rising prices may reflect the nominal
convergence driven by productivity gains, upgraded quality and goodwill standards, structural
change and unit labour costs in the traded sector, and the ensuing matching price mark-ups in
the non-traded sector, as is well known from the most varied scenarios of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect.
3/ Sustainability of the Balance of Payments and the Changing Patterns of FDI
Although most east Europe countries have been net debtors for at least a decade, their
consolidated gross external debts (table 3) are still relatively small by international standards
due to the high proportion of FDI and other equity components in their financial balance.5
The gross external debt of all east European countries increased from 43 per cent of their
aggregate GDP in 1995 to just 47 per cent in 2003.  The rates of indebtedness are even more
                                                
3 R. Horváth and L. Komárek, Optimum Currency Area Theory: An Approach for Thinking about the
Monetary Integration. Warwick Economic Research Papers, no. 647, Univ. of Warwick, August,
2002. The readers can contrast a prudent gradual approach to euro with a jumpstart strategy for a
unilateral euroisation hammered out by S. Gomulka, e.g. in his Poland’s Road to Euro: A Review of
Options. Paper presented at the conference of ONB in Vienna “Convergence and Divergence”,
November, 2001
4 D. Begg, B. Eichengreen, L. Halpern, J. von Hagen and C. Wyplosz, Sustainable Regimes in Capital
Movements in Accession Countries. Policy Paper no. 10, London, CEPR, December, 2002. Paper
available at http://heiwww.unige.ch/%7ewyplosz/. The policy implications of the ERM accession are
discussed in more detail in chapter 3.1, part i.
5 The gross external debt of a country is defined as all recorded liabilities of residents to non-
residents after the deduction of direct investment equity capital (including reinvested earnings) and
other equity securities.  According to the widely accepted definition, a “moderately indebted country”
is one with a gross debt between 48 and 80 per cent of GDP.favourable if the stock of official reserves (representing the international liquidity that can be
used for disbursing the liabilities in case of emergency) is subtracted from the gross external
debt. Such indicators of net debts cut the size of gross debts in eastern Europe by nearly a half.
The levels of net indebtedness (gross debt less official reserves) actually declined or remained
unchanged during the last two years in all countries, except Croatia, thanks to the fast growth
of their official reserves.  Thus, due to the total stock of official reserves of over $93 billion,
the eight acceding countries (with the exception of Estonia) have substantial resources of their
own for backing a smooth transition of their trade under the auspices of the customs union of
the EU in 2004.
Official reserves (table 3) are an important hedging mechanism against attacks on
domestic currency. Their level increased in all 15 countries in the last two years. That means,
the “overall balances” of international payments were in surplus that was absorbed into
reserves. It was an outcome of the commonly agreed policy of national banks to soften the
impact of extensive financial inflows on the nominal appreciation of the exchange rate.  The
net positions of the eight acceding countries on medium- and short-term funds are generally
balanced in maturity, reducing the risks of a liquidity crisis.
Until 2002 the flow of FDI to eastern Europe was steadily increasing.  However, in
2003 the total flow abated by nearly 40 per cent, but only due to the decline of FDI going to
the EU acceding countries, with the exception of Estonia (table 4).  By contrast, the south-east
European economies attracted increasing amounts of direct investment from abroad.  The
degree of dispersion of the FDI stock in eastern Europe as a whole (measured per GDP and
per capita) has declined for the first time since 1993, which may be a sign that the previous
trend of asymmetrical absorption of FDI in the countries of the region is about to be corrected
or even reversed.
The fall in FDI going to central Europe (which followed the four years of massive
inflows - see table 6) can be a delayed consequence of the sharp overall decline of FDI
allocations in the world during 2001 and 2002. In these two years the total world FDI flows
dropped by 53% to a mere $651 billion in 2002.6  As 2003 brought only a slight recovery, the
importance of eastern Europe and the CIS as a FDI attraction remained high.  The slump in
FDI flows reflected the global economic recession, the loss of trust in the “new economy” and
an over-investment in large enterprises.7  But it also reflected a change in the structure of the
FDI inflows: a rapid decline in the share of privatization acquisitions (with privatization in
central Europe running out of the course) and an increasing role of greenfield investments and
investments from retained earnings. Nevertheless, acquisitions still represented more than a
half of the inflows in 2002 and still considerable assets (in banks, public utilities, energy
infrastructure and other sectors) remain in public hands in some of these countries.  The data
                                                
6 World Investment Report, 2003, United Nations and UNCTAD, 2003.
7 See Boston Consulting Group, The Path to Value Creation, Global Corporate Banking 2003,
November, 2003, http://www.bcg.com/publications/files/
the_Path_to%20Value_Creation_Global_%20Corporate_%20Banking_Rpt_Nov%2003.pdf .for 2002-2003 also suggest that countries that accumulated large FDI stocks might potentially
become important FDI exporters (table 5).8
The attraction of capital and investors from abroad is a part of a more complex
macroeconomic mechanism outlined in the study on current accounts in this part of Europe.9
It is also strongly influenced by various microeconomic, policy and institutional factors.10
The degree and the quality of foreign capital absorption in eastern Europe is a reflection of
their perceived growth potential, endowment with natural resources, infrastructure, external
economies, rising international competitiveness of labour, build-up of human capital,
improvements in the protection of property rights and advances in the institutions of financial
intermediation and, quite significantly, by their prospects for the EU membership.
During the period of economic transformation, eastern Europe has accumulated a
potential for remaining among the world’s leaders in FDI absorption. This prolonged
attraction was not only due to some price competitiveness advantages (low wages, less
regulation of businesses or weak trade unions) but mainly because the local conditions are
favourable for the development of FDI in technologies and FDI dependent on human capital.
The current average level of the FDI stock per GDP in eastern Europe (accumulated in less
than 15 years) in 2003 was by 40 per cent higher than the world’s average.  At the same time,
it was still significantly below the values of FDI per capita, customary in the less developed
countries of the EU (for example, $4360 for Portugal or $5290 for Spain in 2002, relative to
$1309 per capita for the whole eastern Europe).
The FDI inflows to eastern Europe have also been changing in their qualitative
characteristics. Thus (as a common specialization pattern in the more advanced east European
economies) foreign firms have expanded in sectors, which require more skilled labour and in
those ones based on high technologies, leaving the activities requiring an intensive use of
unskilled labour to domestic firms.  In central Europe and Estonia the production of
components in the context of multinational supply networks has become an engine of export
growth since the mid-1990s.  At present, between one third and one half of these countries’
exports to the EU comprise components for the automotive, electronic, electric, office
equipment, information technology, and rubber and plastic industries.
11
  Another new
development in the region is the widening of the linkages between local suppliers and the
                                                
8 This provides a new and more robust evidence for the conjecture put forward in W. Andreff, “The
New Multinational Corporations from Transition Countries”. Economic Systems, Vol. 26, No.4, 2002,
pp. 371-379.
9 The study is available as Working Paper of IES no. 49, Charles University, Prague. It can be
downloaded from http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/diplom_det.php?did=392&lng=ang  According to its argument in
chapter 2, any financial account deficit reflects the lack of domestic private savings driving the
interest rate too high, or domestic savings unable to satisfy high demands for investments, or flawed
domestic financial intermediation, and/or deep government deficits.
10 N. Campos and Y. Kinoshita, Why Does FDI Go Where it Goes? New Evidence from the
Transition Economies. IMF, Washington, IMF WP/03/228, November 2003.
11 B. Kaminski and F. Ng, Trade and Production Fragmentation: Central European Economies in
EU Networks of Production and Marketing.  Policy Research Working Paper, The World Bank, June,
2001; G. B. Navaretti, J. Haaland and A. Venables, Multinational Corporations and Global
Production Networks: The Implications for Trade Policy. CEPR, London, Report for the European
Commission, 2002.mother investment company, which increases even more the share of integrated products in
their exports.  The emerging clusters of supply and demand chains, based mainly in central
Europe, have potential to become (moreover, after the EU enlargement) the nucleus of future
industrial agglomerations.
4/  The emerging automobile cluster in Central Europe
Large strategic direct investments are able to overcome the limitations of small
domestic markets and may breed the build-up of large clusters of suppliers around them.
Hence, in terms of policy recommendations, locations in small economies with enterprises of
only local importance, should seek first to establish a strategic link to the “core” in order to be
able to evolve gradually into an integrated local hub.  The emergence of a cluster of industries
amalgamated by backward and forward linkages is therefore conditional on the establishment
of a leader (or an oligopoly of leaders) whose size and progress could guarantee economies of
scale.
The mushrooming of secondary greenfield firms and domestic services around the
strategic enterprise can be illustrated by the development of automobile industry in central
Europe.  Its inception was laid by the acquisition of Škoda by Volkswagen in 1991.  The
output of Škoda motor vehicles increased two-fold during 1993-2002, reaching 446 thousand
units.  It initiated a booming market for the Czech production of car components, so that the
employment in the whole automotive industry increased in the same period by 44 per cent,
value added in constant prices by 187 per cent, real sales by 240 per cent and exports in
nominal euros by 446 per cent.  The dynamic growth of Škoda-Auto spilled over to the whole
automobile industry, which grew at an average rate of 11.7 per cent (in real value added) in
the period 1993-2002.  Thanks to the accompanying learning process, local suppliers of
components and car related services became so competitive that since 2002 the Czechia has
been attracting the largest number of investment projects in the automobile industry in
Europe, overtaking traditional leaders such as the UK and France.
Apart from the Czechia, the boom in automobile production is also present in
Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, producing altogether over 1 million cars.  Until recently, the
cross-border cooperation between the automobile firms in the region was not intensive and
dependence on the supply chains based in the current EU member states dominated both the
production and the trade.  A dramatic change can be expected to come when three additional
plants will operate in the region (consortium Toyota-Peugeot-Citroen in the Czechia, PSA in
Slovakia and Hyunday in Slovakia or Poland) and the total production of cars in the region
will be almost 2.4 million cars a year by 2007.  The new supply strategies count on a higher
use of components produced locally, more intensive dependence on local top-notch business
services and, after the abolition of existing economic barriers coming with the EU accession,
deeper regional cross-border integration of firms.  The resulting higher complexity of
cooperation and competition in the car industry in the triangle Prague-Warsaw-Budapest
offers all advantages of industrial agglomeration: specialised suppliers, pooling of specialisedlabour markets, knowledge spillovers and strong leaders at the end of supply chain subject to
both internal and external scale economies.12
The comparative advantage in cheap labour does not appear to be any longer the main
attraction of eastern Europe.  Instead of economising on variable costs such as wages, the
strategic objective in modern industries moves to fixed cost economies and external
economies associated with the cluster, in this case the car technology cluster.  For example, a
company that would enter the car industry in a location other than the mentioned triangle
would be at an immediate disadvantage because it would be burdened with additional fixed
and transaction costs that are much higher than the wage costs gains.
5/ Investment Promotion Agencies – the Cases of Irish and Czech Expertise
As a policy recommendation, the intermediary role and the cooperation of national
investment promotion agencies are crucial elements in the fostering of such sophisticated
transnational networks because their technological spillovers and other externalities create
additional social returns that may be complementary to private returns to the strategic
investors.
FDI positive spillovers in the technology transfers, supply linkages, build-up of
agglomeration clusters, export penetration, market competition and human capital formation
have all signs of positive externalities. At the same time there are risks of crowding-out of
domestic firms, shrinking of forward and backward linkages, import penetration, abuse of the
market power, hostile takeovers, corruption of public administration and closing down of
local R&D centres. FDI penetration therefore bears strong aspects of public goods, what
implies that its social returns may be different from private returns. Therefore the existence of
FDI incentives may be justified and the surveillance over their provision should be
commissioned to a specific body of public administration – to so called investment promotion
agencies (IPAs). The problems of fuzzy boundary between the public and the private interests,
legislative and economic constraints on the interference with market forces and conflicts
between long-term and short-term aims pose an enormous challenge on the professionalism of
IPAs.
The break-through came from Ireland with the establishment of IDA in 1969
(promotion of foreign investment) and Enterprise Ireland in 1993 (promotion of indigenous
industries). The ensuing Irish miracle became a benchmark for industrial policies all over the
world. Strangely enough, eastern Europe has one IPA – CzechInvest – that has been earning
recently one prize of top European prestige after another. CzechInvest comes from a country
that turned into a leader in FDI attraction as a latecomer. Its performance is based on the
following principles:
a)  It is a government institution following strictly the clearly specified mandate for social
objectives in fostering high-quality FDI projects that contribute to national employment,
competitiveness and growth.
                                                
12 P. Krugman, “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
99, No. 3, 1991, pp. 483-499.b)  The strict independence from the government is anchored only informally – by the
professional prestige, ethics and maximal transparency of CzechInvest’s activities.
c)  It covers the complex of agendas associated with FDI, EU structural funds and indigenous
business development.
d)  CzechInvest in closely related to the government policies in investment incentive
schemes, building of industrial zones and parks and general business development.
e)  It has very stable and young board of top management.
f)  Its activities vary from deeply regional up to world-wide
g)  In personal policy the emphasis is given to a team building and a personal accountability
in satisfying the complex business servicing for customers.
h)  Given the objectives and the breakdown of strategic plan into operational internal
objectives, the evaluation of people and the audit of processes is effected annually.
i)  The experiences from the direct contacts with investment reality are fed back regularly to
the government in order to fine-tune the climate for enterprise development.
  Evidently, the quest for a model of an agency of high performance should not start
from technical or organisational details but from the people, the ethics and the creation of a
self-sustaining informal environment that is conducive to incentives for even higher
achievements.
FIGURE 1: Share of the total compensation of employees in GDP, 1998 and 2002
(in per cent of GDP)
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos, March, 2004
6/  Human Capital, Labour Costs and Competitiveness
Human capital is gradually superseding the role of simple labour as the primary factor
of comparative advantage of the east European economies mainly due to the changing pattern
of specialisation by foreign enterprises.  Nevertheless, the role of competitive wage rates






















































































































































































































2002level of the wage rates and in relative terms, as a share of total costs (which on the aggregate
level can be illustrated by the share of total compensation of employees in GDP - see figure 1)
are still relatively low compared to developed market economies. In table 6 the difference to
100 per cent is an aggregate measure of the gross profit margin, or return on capital.  Even
though this margin on average is still higher in eastern Europe than in the EU, the average
premium of 13.5 per cent is not large.
However, in recent years nominal wages in some of the east European countries have
tended to grow faster than productivity, which can undermine the cost competitiveness of the
enterprises in the tradable sector.  Hungary is the most typical example where the payrises in
the public sector, as a part of electoral campain, spilled over to the private sector
incommensurably to the productivity advances.  In addition, there is the danger of wage
spillovers from more productive foreign-controlled firms to less productive domestic
enterprises.  The problem rests in the dual nature of these economies characterized by
considerable productivity differentials; due to this, although absolute wages in domestic firms
can be lower than those in foreign-controlled firms, in relative terms they can still be higher,
reducing further the returns to capital in the indigenous sector.13  Hence, any pay rise that is
not justified by productivity gains can weaken further the viability of domestic firms,
meanwhile the foreign firms can absorb it easier.
Even though the service sector – real estate, financial intermediation, retail trade,
telecommunications – has dominated the structure of FDI inflows to eastern Europe in nearly
all countries (accounting for over 60 per cent of all FDI flows in central Europe and even
more in the Baltic states), a new trend has emerged recently of a growing number of FDI
projects in the fields of information networks, research and development and business
support, offering jobs in high skill and knowledge-based activities.14
The penetration of foreign capital in the sector of corporate banking in some east
European countries is really unprecedented, as is demonstrated in figure 2.  Thus while
foreign ownership in the banking sector in four of the central European countries is now
around 80 per cent, in the Eurozone it is still of marginal importance. In the EU, mergers and
acquisitions mainly occurred inside the domestic banking sector and the role of foreign
penetration by establishing cross-border branches  was minimal.  Only in Ireland and
Luxembourg the market share of foreign banks exceeds 10 per cent.  United Kingdom is the
only exception to the rule of domestic dominance, with a penetration rate of banking by
branches from the EU alone by holding 23.7% of the total value of balance sheets in the
country in 2001. 15
                                                
13 A. Zemplinerová, op. cit.
14 The current investment by one of the world’s largest logistics companies DHL (which is relocating
its IT activities from Britain and Switzerland to the Czechia) is seen by many of a similar significance
as the Volkswagen investment in 1991 that initiated the build-up the fastest growing automobile
cluster in Europe.
15 K. Mérö and M. E. Valentinyi, The Role of Foreign Banks in Five Central and Eastern European
Countries. Hungarian National Bank, Working Paper no. 10, November, 2003.FIGURE 2:  Foreign ownership of the banking sector in central Europe, 2002-2003
Proportion of foreign banks' equity capital and assets on national total in per cent
Source: Statistics of national banks, March, 2004
In eastern Europe the cross-border takeovers helped to capitalise the troubled domestic
banks and improved their efficiency. That was a crucial point because in the early stages of
transition the allocation of private savings into investments resulted in loans to enterprises
without much growth, what in some countries (e.g. Czechia, Slovakia and Romania) caused a
proliferation of large bad debts. There are fears that the anomaly in the foreign management of
banks could be pro-cyclical in their response to domestic shocks and subject to contagion
originating in home countries. Since the phenomenon of mass foreign ownership of banks in
developed countries is rather new in the world of banking, there is only an inconclusive
evidence from Latin America that sheds little light to the question how the foreign banks in
Eastern Europe will react to a serious crisis in the region.
The cross-border takeovers played a very important role for the restructuring of eastern
Europe’s the banking sector: the new owners injected new capital (to recapitalize troubled
domestic banks) and managerial know-how, reorganized the bank’s structure and operation,
introduced new banking products, all of which produced significant efficiency gains.
Successful, highly profitable acquisitions in the East European financial markets have
contributed to a rapidly growing prices of the foreign investing banks’ equity. Given their
expanding holdings in eastern Europe, such smaller regional banks (e.g. Erste, Raiffeisen or
KBC), may become attractive targets for takeovers by much larger banks from USA, Germany



























































































Share on assets7.  Conclusion: Fight for a Model Central /East/ European
The stereotypes of anecdotal evidence say that an East European is a person who
abuses the collective system by taking a larger share of gains at dumping the costs on others,
who blames his problems on external hostility and who impedes his neighbour’s success. This
picture is a prisoner’s dilemma trap where all participants are relatively worse off at the end.
A model inverse of such a person is someone who upgrades the system at his/her own costs,
who takes the responsibility for his actions and who loves his country against all odds. This
later story is an acknowledgement of the superiority of collective gains against private gains
and of strategic gains over the tactical ones.
In reality, there is nothing particular in the trade-offs between such contradictory social
choices, as the theory of public choice shows. It is an everlasting problem of all social systems
and the balance between alternative choices may change in time. As was explained by Baumol
or by Olson, it is the tuning of the system of institutions that strikes the difference between a
predation and a collective action.16 After the weathering-out of the stormy 90s, when rent-
seeking and the drive for redistribution molded a large part of the domestic development in
the majority of our 15 analysed countries, much more people in post-communist countries
now realize that their future is associated with a need for a more collectively responsible
behaviour. Instead of accumulating debts abroad, the transition countries in Europe
concentrate more on FDI and domestic resources. That sounds like a promising new strategic
orientation in their development, which would be potentially able to eliminate the burden of
their past transition tangle.
We have seen that 15 transition countries from Central, Baltic and South-East region
share several converging common features in tackling the crucial problem of external balance.
Their financial accounts are able to finance the current account deficits in a sustainable way,
pointing to the existence of natural equilibrium in their intensive integration with the world
economy and especially with the EU. The prevailing pattern of the “division of labour” in the
financial transactions, where FDI inflows play a dominant role, is mutually advantageous for
all cooperating parties. It brings substantial returns to both the foreign investors and the
domestic economy, in addition it allows for the buildup of monetary reserves that strengthen
the domestic monetary position in both the capital sharing with the Eurozone and the
revamping of the domestic economy. Thus the advances in the external sector became an
engine of development and stability of the national economies in the studied 15 countries.
                                                
16  W. J. Baumol, “Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive”. J. of Political
Economy, 98, p. 893-921
Olson M., The Rise and Decline of Nations. Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1982
Olson M., Power and Prosperity. Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. Basic Books,
New York, 2000Jan-Sep. Jan.-Sep. Jan.-Sep.
2002 2003 2003 2003 2003
Eastern Europe   29537 41349 29641 27099 8,0 6,1 15436 7840 3,0 1,8
Albania   363 435 322 336 9,0 7,6 29 79 0,6 1,8
Bosnia and Herzegovina   2067 1620 969 1449 29,9 29,3 -109 47 -2,0 0,9
Bulgaria   1117 1299 413 1428 8,4 10,1 586 595 3,8 4,2
Croatia   2038 2605 1541 1265 11,6 6,0 697 742 3,1 3,5
Czechia  5038 11043 9528 4025 15,0 6,5 6627 364 9,0 0,6
Est onia   292 854 550 960 13,1 15,6 55 62 0,8 1,0
Hungary c   1658 872 -168 5131 1,3 8,5 -1784 1249 -2,7 2,1
Latvia   1037 649 414 741 7,7 10,2 2 92 0,0 1,3
Lithuania   899 1157 681 981 8,4 7,6 423 226 3,1 1,8
Poland    6728 7339 5947 4401 3,9 2,9 639 1437 0,3 1,0
Romania   3707 3327 2365 3076 7,3 8,1 1802 1245 3,9 3,3
Ser b ia and  Mon t en egro   1139 2842 2171 2459 18,1 16,9 1111 1068 7,1 7,4
Slovak ia   1890 5585 3988 331 23,1 1,4 3646 258 15,1 1,1
Sloven ia   1245 1529 766 265 7,0 1,3 1842 330 8,4 1,6
Macedonia   321 195 152 250 5,3 7,4 -131 46 -3,5 1,4
Memorandum items:
EU acces. countries-8 18785 29027 21708 16836 7,2 4,9 11451 4018 2,8 1,2
     Baltic states   2227 2660 1645 2683 9,3 10,2 480 380 1,7 1,4
     Central Europe   16558 26367 20062 14154 7,1 4,5 10971 3638 2,9 1,2
South-east Europe    10752 12322 7933 10263 10,9 10,2 3985 3822 3,5 3,8
Change in official 
reserves b
TABLE 1:  Net financial flows into eastern Europe, 2001-2003                                                           Million dollars, per cent
     a  Includes errors and omissions; excludes changes in official reserves
Capital and financial account flows a
(million dollars)
Change in reserves / 
GDP b
     b  A negative sign indicates a decrease in reserves.
     c  Excludes reinvested profits (net inflow).
Country or region 2001 2002 2002 2002 2002
     Source:  UNECE calculations, based on national balance of payments statistics and IMF, Staff Country Reports (Washington, D.C.)
Jan.-Sep.
(per cent) (million dollars) Capital flows / GDP Jan.-Sep. Jan.-Sep.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003
Capital and financial account c  19,2 14,3 27,4 16,4 6,7 9,3 13,1 10,6
Capital and financial account d   22,0 18,8 29,0 16,8 6,8 10,8 12,3 10,3
of which: 
     FDI   17,3 17,4 20,2 5,8 3,6 4,3 3,6 4,3
     Portfolio investment   1,7 3,3 1,3 0,8 0,6 1,2 0,0 1,4
     Medium-, long-term funds   2,5 -1,6 0,4 1,9 2,9 2,5 4,7 3,5
     Short-term funds   -2,7 -5,1 5,1 7,9 -1,0 0,6 3,8 0,7
     Errors and omissions   2,8 4,4 1,6 0,4 0,1 1,5 -0,8 -0,4
     Capital account 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,5 0,6 0,8 0,5
  Short-term investment e 1,8 2,6 8,1 9,1 -0,3 3,3 3,1 1,8
e Includes portfolio investments, short-term funds and errors and omissions
Source:  UNECE secretariat estimates, based on national balance of payments statistics.
b Includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and  
d Including errors and omissions, but excluding the change in official reserves.
a Includes Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
c Excluding errors and omissions and the change in official reserves.
South-East Europe countries b
TABLE 2:  Net financial flows by type of capital into eastern Europe, 2000-2003            Billion dollars
EU acceding countries 8 a
Type of capital 2001 2003 b 2001 2003 b 2001 2003 b 2001 2003 b 2001 2003 b 2001 2003 b
Eastern Europe   212605 292536 106 102 46 47 79922 121096 4,0 4,3 62 59
Albania   1199 1300 120 87 28 22 740 949 5,0 4,4 38 27
Bosnia and Herzegovina   2600 2700 137 110 56 39 1221 1510 3,3 2,9 53 44
Bulgaria   10616 12381 135 109 78 62 3291 5503 4,3 4,7 69 56
Croatia   11317 19973 113 132 57 68 4703 7058 4,8 4,4 58 65
Czechia 22374 28389 52 47 37 30 14341 25556 3,7 4,6 36 10
Estonia   3279 5936 63 84 59 69 820 1174 1,7 1,6 75 80
Hungary   32683 49313 82 94 63 56 10727 12778 3,1 2,6 67 74
Latvia   5570 8415 151 164 73 83 1149 1396 3,1 2,5 79 83
Lithuania   5268 7220 84 73 44 39 1618 2823 2,7 3,0 69 61
Poland   71900 93266 195 188 39 45 25648 31595 6,1 6,0 64 66
Romania   12327 18580 89 84 31 33 5442 8785 3,8 4,0 56 53
Serbia and Montenegro   11740 13314 420 340 103 66 1005 3222 2,3 4,5 91 76
Slovakia   11043 15386 71 57 53 47 4141 10023 2,9 4,4 63 35
Slovenia   9182 14632 78 87 47 52 4330 7876 4,4 5,6 53 46
Macedonia 1507 1731 104 97 44 37 745 849 4,4 3,7 51 51
Memorandum items:
EU accession countries-8 161299 222557 100 98 45 46 62774 93221 4,1 4,3 61 58
     Baltic states   14117 21571 93 98 56 58 3587 5393 2,5 2,4 75 75
     Central Europe   147182 200987 100 98 44 45 59188 87828 4,2 4,5 60 56







(per cent) a Million dollars
     a Total exports and factor income receipts.  Total imports and factor income payments, respectively.
     b Gross debt at end September 2003. 
TABLE 3:  Selected external financial indicators for eastern Europe, 2001 and 2003          Million dollars, per cent
     Source:  National statistics; The World Bank; International Financial Statistics, 2003 and UNECE Geneva.  






(per cent) Months of imports % / GDP b USD mil. % / GDP b dollars % of EE
Jan-Sep per capita b average
2002 2002 2003 2003 2003 2003 Sep 2003 per capita
Eastern Europe   25491 19786 11731 2,7 164848 37,3 1309 100
Albania 135 94 108 2,4 1029 23,1 297 23
Bosnia and Herzegovina   293 178 206 4,2 1014 20,5 236 18
Bulgaria 905 636 925 6,6 5951 42,2 766 59
Croatia   1124 785 1180 5,6 8765 41,8 1973 151
Czechia 9305 8159 4004 6,5 42697 68,9 4186 320
Estonia   285 217 640 10,4 3817 61,9 2809 215
Hungary c  858 662 -743 -1,2 24856 41,3 2447 187
Latvia   382 342 249 3,4 3281 45,3 1403 107
Lithuania   732 545 126 1,0 3743 29,0 1079 82
Poland   4119 2659 2452 1,6 41979 28,1 1098 84
Romania   1144 803 1099 2,9 9958 26,1 445 34
Serbia and Montenegro   475 310 883 6,1 2538 17,5 305 23
Slovakia   4012 3391 472 2,0 10618 45,2 1974 151
Slovenia   1644 942 96 0,5 3638 18,1 1823 139
Macedonia 77 64 34 1,0 962 28,5 471 36
Memorandum items:
EU accession countries-8 21338 16916 7295 2,1 134630 39,4 1841 141
     Baltic states   1399 1104 1015 3,9 10841 41,2 1513 116
     Central Europe   19939 15812 6280 2,0 123789 39,3 1877 143
South-east Europe    4153 2870 4436 4,4 30218 30,1 572 44
Cummulative net inflows (stocks) a Inflows
    a Net of residents’ investments abroad:  Bulgaria, 1990-1994; Poland, 1990-1992; Macedonia, 1990-1998. 
c Excludes reinvested profits; otherwise the Hungarian FDI inflows in September 2003 would be higher by
approximately $1.65 billion and by $2 billion in 2002 (according to the estimates of the Hungarian National Bank).  




Source:  National balance of payments; IMFStatistics and Staff Country Reports; UNECE estimates.
    b National forecasts of the GDP for the 3rd quarter of 2003 and the population for 2003 are used in the denominator.
Jan-SepCountry or region
Cummulative 
1990-2000 b 2001 2002




Eastern Europe  -3925 -1127 -1703 -1578 -8333
Albania 2 0 0 0 2
Bosnia and Herzegovina   0 0 0 0 0
Bulgaria 18 -10 -29 -15 -36
Croatia   -390 -155 -533 -42 -1119
Czechia -705 -165 -276 -122 -1268
Estonia   -342 -200 -132 -117 -791
Hungary c -1857 -346 -265 -720 -3187
Latvia   42 -12 -8 -26 -5
Lithuania   -45 -7 -18 -31 -100
Poland    -468 -67 -330 -248 -1113
Romania   -21 17 -16 -41 -61
Serbia and Montenegro   0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia   -3 -37 -5 -1 -45
Slovenia   -152 -145 -93 -215 -604
Macedonia 0 -1 0 0 -1
Memorandum items:
EU acces. countries - 8 -3534 -979 -1126 -1479 -7117
     Baltic states  -348 -219 -157 -174 -899
     Central Europe -3186 -759 -969 -1305 -6218
South-east Europe   -391 -148 -578 -99 -1215
(Million dollars)
TABLE 5:  Outflows of FDI from eastern Europe, 1990-2003 a
     Source:  National balance of payments statistics; IMF and UNECE estimates. 
     c Excludes reinvested profits.
     b  Totals include UNECE secretariat estimates for countries for which data were missing for 1990-
95: all of these had negligible FDI outflows.
     a  Outflows of FDI from the reporting countries. A negative sign indicates a net outflow of capital by 
national economic residents.  A positive sign indicates a net repatriation of such capital.TABLE 6: Inflows of foreign direct investment in Central  and South-eastern Europe, 1990-2002 (in million US dollars) a
Country or region 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Eastern Europe   ..   ..   ..   ..   ..   ..   8756 11374 17547 20136 21855 22807 25491
Albania  0 0 20 68 53 70 90 48 45 41 143 207 135
Bosnia and Herzeg.  ..   ..   ..   ..   0 0 0 0 67 177 146 125 293
Bulgaria b   4 56 41 40 105 90 109 505 537 819 1002 813 905
Croatia   0 0 16 120 117 114 511 533 932 1467 1089 1561 1124
Czechia  132 513 1004 654 869 2562 1428 1300 3718 6324 4986 5641 9305
Estonia   ..   ..   82 162 215 202 151 267 581 305 387 542 285
Hungary c  311 1459 1471 2339 1146 4815 2364 2229 2083 2012 1697 2599 858
Latvia   ..   ..   29 45 214 180 382 521 357 347 410 164 382
Lithuania   ..   ..   8 30 31 73 152 355 926 486 379 446 732
Poland  b 10 117 284 580 542 1132 2768 3077 5130 6474 8293 6995 4119
Romania   0 40 77 94 341 419 263 1215 2031 1041 1037 1157 1144
Serbia and Monten. ..   ..   ..   ..   ..   ..   0 740 113 112 50 165 475
Slovakia   18 82 100 195 269 308 353 220 684 390 1925 1579 4012
Slovenia   4 65 111 113 117 151 174 334 216 107 136 370 1644
Macedonia b   ..   ..   ..   0 24 9 11 30 128 33 175 442 77
Memorandum items:
EU acces. countries-8 ..   ..   3089 4118 3403 9421 7772 8303 13694 16446 18214 18336 21338
     Baltic states-3 ..   ..   119 238 460 454 685 1142 1863 1139 1176 1152 1399
     Central Europe-5 476 2236 2970 3880 2942 8967 7087 7161 11831 15307 17038 17184 19939
South-east Europe   ..   ..   ..   ..   ..   ..   984 3070 3853 3690 3641 4471 4153
Russia 0 100 1454 1211 690 2065 2579 4865 2761 3309 2714 2748 3442
     Source:  National balance of payments statistics; IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics and Staff Country Reports; UNECE estimates.
     a  Inflows into the reporting country.
     b  Net of residents’ investments abroad.  Bulgaria, 1990-1994; Poland, 1990-1992; Macedonia, 1990-1998.Dosud vyšlo :
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